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Abstract 
This paper argues that in addition to the familiar approach using formal contexts, there is 
now a need in artificial intelligence to study contexts as social constructs. As a successful 
example of the latter approach, I draw attention to 'interpretation' (in the sense of literary the- 
ory), viz. the reconstruction of the intended meaning of a literary text that takes into account 
the context in which the author assumed the reader would place the text. An important con- 
tribution here comes from Wendell Harris, enumerating the seven crucial dimensions of con- 
text: knowledge of reality, knowledge of language, and the authorial, generic, collective, spe- 
cific, and textual dimensions. Finally, two recent approaches to interpretation, due to Jon 
Barwise and Jerry Hobbs, are analyzed as useful attempts which also come to grips with the 
notion of context. 
It must be noted that there has been a considerable body of contributions connecting lin- 
guistic structure with social context. For example, anthropological linguistics, from Bronislaw 
Malinowski onwards, has underlined the cultural context of discourse as essential to meaning. 
This viewpoint became prominent with the emergence of the ethnography of speaking in 
anthropology. Thus, conversation analysis represents a consistent formal effort to contribute 
to an analysis of the nature of context. While this paper emphasizes and reviews the literary 
theory approach, it makes various contacts with works of the latter kind (e.g., the landmark 
contributions of Erving Goffman, John Gumperz, William Hanks, John Heritage, Dell 
Hymes, et al.) in order to deliver a more balanced and complete study of the dimensions of 
context. © 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. 
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1. Introduct ion 
"Every great, liberating idea inevitably becomes a straight-jacket in time", Hegel 
once quipped. Nothing can be truer in the case of artificial intelligence (AI) 
approaches to context, already a key concept in the fields of semantics, pragmatics, 
ethnographical studies of language use, and so on. 
Starting with McCarthy's celebrated article (1987) which formulated the need for 
and a glimpse of formal contexts, a great majority of the AI-based works on context 
had a logical - thus, to some extent, computational - character. (The reader is referred 
to Akman and Surav, 1996, for a reasonably detailed review of these.) While this ten- 
dency is healthy and of fundamental importance, it is important to note that other aca- 
demic disciplines, such as linguistics, philosophy, anthropology, etc., have also studied 
various aspects of the context phenomena. By just limiting their attention to formalized 
contexts, AI researchers are committing a grave mistake because it looks like there is 
only so much one can say about formalized contexts (Akman and Surav, 1997; 
McCarthy and Buva~, 1997). Therefore, I believe that any serious progress in further 
delineating the notion of context will have to borrow from the afore-mentioned disci- 
plines, and additionally, from psychology and literary theory. Clark's recent books 
(1992, 1996), which argue that language use embodies both individual and social 
processes, may be regarded as fine examples of the contribution the former discipline 
(psychology) can make to the scientific study of context. It is my intention to consider 
the latter discipline (literary theory) in this paper. Specifically, I want to recast a book, 
Harris (1988), and two papers in literary interpretation, Barwise (1989) and Hobbs 
(1990), and explain what important observations they include vis-h-vis context. 
While the central theme of this paper is thus literary theory, earnest attention is 
paid to prominent areas such as anthropological linguistics, ethnomethodology, and 
sociolinguistics, for they also make consistent efforts to connect linguistic structure 
with social context. From Malinowski onwards, the sociocultural context of utter- 
ances has been regarded as crucial to meaning (and action); with the emergence of 
the ethnography of speaking within the discipline of anthropology, this perspective 
has been largely established. Sacks' concern with the contextual sensitivity of lan- 
guage use in a variety of social relations has been at the center of his 'conversation 
analysis' fight from the start. All these studies have solidified the contribution of cul- 
tural contextualization to the understanding of language (Goodwin and Duranti, 
1992). This is why the relationship between language and sociocultural order is 
something of which I take cognizance in this paper. 
2. Context as a garbage can 
In an article written almost 20 years ago, Clark and Carlson (1981: 313) noted 
that "[a]lthough the notion of context plays a central role in most current explana- 
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tions of  language understanding, what can count as context is generally undefined". 
I think that this situation has changed considerably; besides, now we probably have 
a better idea why we need to define and circumscribe the extent of context. For, 
again in the words of Clark and Carlson (1981:313) ,  "[ i]f  it [context] includes any 
information a listener can make available to himself, then it loses much of its power 
to explain" (my emphasis). That context has become a favorite word in the vocabu- 
lary of  cognitive psychologists and that it has appeared in the titles of  a vast number 
of articles are well-known facts. This is why Clark and Carlson complain that the 
denotation of the word has become murkier as its uses have been extended in many 
directions. Not surprisingly, they deliver the now widespread opinion that context 
has become some sort of  'conceptual garbage can'. 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary the term 'context'  usually has two 
primary meanings: (i) the words around a word, phrase, statement, etc. often used to 
help explain (fix) the meaning; (ii) the general conditions (circumstances) in which 
an event, action, etc. takes place. Clearly, the first meaning is closely related to lin- 
guistic meaning and linguists' use of  the term, whereas the second - more general -
meaning is the one which is closer to a desirable account of context in AI. (It is com- 
monly thought that the main AI uses of  formalized context will be in connection 
with reasoning about the effects of goal-oriented actions.) 
In a dictionary of philosophy (Angeles, 1981), the same term is defined, reflecting 
the latter desideratum ore satisfactorily, as follows: 
Context (Latin contexere, 'to weave together'): The sum total of meanings (associations, ideas, assump- 
tions, preconceptions, etc.) that (i) are intimately related to a thing, (ii) provide the origins for, and (iii) 
influence our attitudes, perspectives, judgments, and knowledge of that thing. 
In another dictionary (Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary), the preva- 
lent meanings of the term include the following: 
- The context of something consists of the ideas, situations, events, or information that relate to it and 
make it possible to understand it fully. 
- If something is seen in context or if it is put into context, it is considered with all the factors that are 
related to it rather than just being considered on its own, so that it can be properly understood. 
- If a remark, statement, etc. is taken or quoted out of context, it is only considered on its own and the 
circumstances in which it was said are ignored. It, therefore, seems to mean something different from 
the meaning that was intended. 
Context is also a crucial factor in communication. Ordinary observation proves its 
importance in assorted ways. Just consider the confusion which results from lack of 
contextual information when, for example, I join a scheduled meeting half an hour 
late. Without clues of  the original context, I might find it hard to make sense of the 
ongoing discussion. In any case, the discussants would realize that they cannot 
assume a lot about the background knowledge I possess and would normally give me 
a quick rundown of the conversations so far. This is essentially the view of Clark and 
Carlson (1981), who regard context as information that is available to a person for 
interaction with a particular process on a given occasion. Their intrinsic context is an 
attempt o capture the information available to a process that is potentially necessary 
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for it to succeed. The intrinsic context for grasping what a speaker means on some 
occasion is the (limited) totality of the knowledge, beliefs, and suppositions that are 
shared by the speaker and the listener, a.k.a, the common ground (Clark et al., 1983). 
Can there be a notion of sentence meaning that is independent of context, i.e., a 
level at which a given sentence has a single meaning, but may be employed for dif- 
ferent purposes? I believe that the answer many semanticists usually give to this 
question is at least partly in the affirmative. In fact, according to orthodox semantic 
theory (Allen, 1995: 228), there is a representation f context-independent meaning 
called the logical form, and the aim of semantic interpretation is simply to map a 
sentence to its logical form. While this approach yielded many useful results for the 
toy examples of semantic theory - especially in regard to indexicals and definite 
descriptions; see, e.g., Cresswell (1996) - I think it is misdirected in general and 
cannot really be of much use in an AI-based study of context. For example, it has 
been pointed out numerous times that even sentences such as 'The cat is on the mat' 
require a minimal (non-empty) set of background conditions, e.g., that the earth's 
gravitational field is in effect, that the mat is lying flat, that the mat is a standard 
(normal size) mat, and so on. In the words of Fish (1980: 310): 
"It is impossible even to think of a sentence independently of context, and when we are asked to con- 
sider a sentence for which no context has been specified, we will automatically hear it in the context in 
which it has been most often encountered." (my emphasis) 
3. Setting out the sociocultural scene 
It turns out that strong analytic frameworks focusing on assorted aspects of con- 
text have been contributed by researchers working in a number of different fields 
including anthropological linguistics, ethnomethodology, and sociolinguistics (Drew 
and Heritage, 1992). 
Hymes developed the concept of communicative competence (1972) and his cele- 
brated SPEAKING model (1974, 1986) to encourage a cultural approach to the 
analysis of discourse. His categories - enumerated below - are sophisticated enough 
to analyze various kinds of discourse: 
[S]etting and scene: The former refers to the time and place of a speech act whereas 
the latter is the psychological setting or 'cultural definition' of a scene. For instance, 
the faculty club might be the setting for a talk commemorating the late Prof. X. The 
range of formality would change according to the content of the talk. 
[P]articipants: These include the speaker and audience (addressees plus other hear- 
ers). At the faculty club, the waiter, although not addressed by the speaker, might 
also hear parts of the talk. 
[E]nds: This refers to the purpose of the discourse. The goal of the commemorative 
event is to honor Prof. X posthumously. 
[A]ct sequence: This is the format and order of the series of speech events which 
make up the speech act. The talk might begin with an enumeration of the achieve- 
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ments of Prof. X. Once the talk is over, an applause follows and Prof. X's daughter 
is invited to receive a plaque. 
[K]ey: These are the cues that establish the tone of the speech act. In an attempt 
towards playfulness, the speaker at the faculty club may employ the lecturing format 
of Prof. X and may play with his glasses in the inimitable style of Prof. X. 
[l]nstrumentalities: These are the forms and styles of speech. The speaker at the club 
will probably talk casually but may choose to use carefully prepared grammatical 
forms, if say, the president of the university is present. 
[N]orms: These refer to the social rules governing the event and the participants' 
actions. In the faculty club, interruptions and contributions by the audience may be 
permitted. In a more formal event, 'no interruptions' would probably be the stan- 
dard. 
[G]enre: This includes assorted categories such as poem, myth, tale, proverb, riddle, 
curse, prayer, oration, lecture, commercial, form letter, editorial, etc. 
Another contribution coming from sociolinguistics i Gumperz's contextualiza- 
tion cue (Gumperz, 1992). He maintains that a given aspect of linguistic behavior 
(e.g., lexical, prosodic, phonological, etc.) can function as a cue, indicating those 
aspects of context which are to be taken into account o interpret what is said by a 
speaker. Contextualization cues hint at relevant aspects of the social context (via par- 
ticular codes, styles, and dialects), thus enabling participants in a discourse to reason 
about their respective communicative intentions and purposes (Gumperz, 1982, 
1990). The notion of contextualization cue may be regarded as an important formal 
device, helping us to understand the relationship between language use and speakers' 
contextual reasoning. After all, it is a particular type of indexical, which (in combi- 
nation with other cues and structural properties of an utterance) brings about a cer- 
tain interpretation f the utterance (in a context). Gumperz (1993) offers a case study 
of how differences in the use of contextualization cues between a native speaker of 
English and a non-native, yet fluent speaker of English cause a serious breakdown in 
communication. 
Even if speakers employ basically the same language, the rules for its usage would 
differ according to age, gender, ethnicity, class, etc. (Garfinkel, 1967). Accordingly, 
there is a healthy parallelism between Gumperz's linguistic oncept of contextualiza- 
tion cues and Goffman's ociological concept (1974) of a frame. Goffman studies the 
'definition' which participants give to a given social activity. His notion of frame 
focuses on what is going on, what is the situation, what are the participants' roles in 
this situation, etc. Goffman's affiliated notion of footing (1981) refers to the dynamic 
character of frames, i.e., the evaluations (respectively, redirections) made (respec- 
tively, adopted) by the participants in passing from one frame to another. 
Being social concepts that converge on the organizational spects of individuals' 
conduct, Goffman's frame and footing are interesting in their own right. But, more 
importantly, they are linguistically relevant: participants in a discourse negotiate 
frames and, using discourse cues and markers, affect changes in footing. 
Surely, a given context not only 'legislates' the interpretation of indexical ele- 
ments; indexical elements can also mold the background of the context. Ochs (1990) 
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gives an example from Japanese culture where the affective dimension of a context 
can be enriched by the use of particular indexical elements to fabricate particular 
types of social identities. 
Silverstein (1992) also demonstrated how treatments of context in "deterministic 
theories of syntactic structure, or deterministically computable notions of seman- 
tics/pragmatics" run into inescapable and indomitable problems because it [context] 
is forever unbounded, accountable in indefinitely many ways, and limitlessly defea- 
sible. Silverstein has two construals of contextualization. I  the narrower construal, 
a text is read by taking all denotation as potentially indexical, relative to the 'sur- 
round' context and the sociocultural context. In the wider construal, one takes the 
stance of those social sciences that locate the object of investigation i  societies and 
social groups. The aim is to seek to know how language use indexes (and hence 
brings into contextual reality) those implicit values of relational identity and power 
(i.e., culture, in the social anthropological sense). 
Schegloff (1991) distinguished between two types of context in the social and 
human sciences, especially with respect o interaction and discourse. The external 
(distal) context includes aspects of social life central to the social sciences (e.g., the 
class, ethnic, and gender composition of an interaction). The discourse (proximate) 
context is the sort of sequences of talk or courses of conduct in which particular 
events may occur (stories, etc.) and interactants act, relative to the episode in 
progress (e.g., as the narrator of a story). 
4. The experiential nature of context 
Considerations such as those in the preceding section suggest he useful heuristic 
that 'experience' may be a comprehensive synonym for 'total context', because 
"only that which has entered our experience is available to aid us in interpretation" 
(Harris, 1988: 78). Clearly, this experience is a social and cultural construct: it is 
shaped and obtained by an individual growing up within the confines of a society. 
Suzuki (1984) notes that the culture of a country affects all aspects of the life and 
thought of the people living in that country. Jahoda (1997: 37) states that social insti- 
tutions are all "cultural components hat a growing child gradually absorbs". She fur- 
ther argues that informal institutions (customs, traditions, etc.) are crucial in that they 
become "individual habits, a part of one's own identity that is shared with all who 
belong together". Similarly, take the following remarks of Auster (1995: 140): 
"The text is no more than a springboard for the imagination. 'Once upon a time there was a girl who 
lived with her mother in a house at the edge of a large wood.' You don't know what he girl looks like, 
you don't know what color the house is, you don't know if the mother is tall or short, fat or thin, you 
know next o nothing. But the mind won't allow these things to remain blank; it fills in the details itself, 
it creates images based on its own memories and experiences - which is why these stories [fairy tales] 
resonate so deeply inside us." (my emphasis) 
Auster uses considerations of the above sort to explain why his own writing style, 
one that is frequently devoid of descriptive passages and the background that char- 
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acterize the typical novel, is still able to create full-fledged worlds. Having been 
influenced by fairy tales (the Brothers Grimm, the Thousand and One Nights, etc.), 
his works communicate in the most economical way large amounts of information 
simply because, he thinks, the reader is able to supply the details based on her own 
memories and experiences. In short, "[t]he listener becomes an active participant in 
the story" (Auster, 1995: 140). 
Notice that the experiential nature of context can cause bona fide confusions for 
the participants in a 'discourse'.  The following example comes from ethnomethod- 
ology (Sacks, 1992: 473): 
"On one occasion he [Phineas, a four-year old child] and other children had made a 'ship' in the school- 
room, with an arrangement of tables and chairs. Phineas' part in this was comparatively a passive one, 
as he was but a 'passenger' on the ship, and was going on with his own pursuits on the voyage, sitting 
at a table and sewing a canvas bag. Miss D. was with him 'in the ship', and all around them the crew 
and the captain carried on the business of the voyage. And when, presently, a new supply of thread was 
wanted, and Miss D. said to Phineas "Will you get it out of the drawer?" Phineas replied "I can't get 
out of the ship while it's going, can I?" and called out in a stentorian voice to the 'captain,' "Stop the 
ship, I want o get out". After some demur, the ship was brought into a 'landing stage' and Phineas got 
out, secured his thread, and got in again, saying 'Now it can go again'." 
In the reported scene, two agents A and C (Miss D., adult, and Phineas, child), are 
individuating the reality in two different ways. C's  account of it as a boat scene is at 
odds with A's account of it as an imitative game, i.e., a game where kids simulate 
some real environment in their play. C, being totally immersed in the game, does not 
see that in games rules can be violated, whereas A is able to 'switch' to the more 
realistic context whenever there is such a need. Here is another, similar piece of data 
mentioned by Sacks (1992: 473): 
"She [a five-year old girl] looked up at me expectantly, anticipating that I [the teacher] would push her. 
I said firmly, "No. Put your knee in the wagon and you can push yourself". She sat several seconds, 
obviously waiting for me to push her. She waited long enough to be certain I wasn't going to push. Then 
she got down, put one knee in the wagon and the other on the floor of the cement porch, getting ready 
to push herself. In order to encourage her I said "Come on". She didn't move. She looked straight ahead. 
She announced, "There's a car coming". Then she looked at me indignantly. She was seemingly dis- 
gusted that I couldn't see this car that she announced. An imaginary car was coming, and she had to wait 
for it to get out of the way." 
Again, the teacher is assuming that the little girl can do the pushing act by just 
leaving the play context for an instant. The girl, on the other hand, is determined to 
stay within the game context and take the requisite precautions such as minding an 
approaching car. The contexts of the teacher and the student are at a clash. 
In light of these (and numerous other) observations of Sacks, it is fruitful to take 
social knowledge to be a significant component of contexts (Devlin and Rosenberg, 
1996). In a nutshell, the 'ethnography of speaking' framework has clarified the con- 
tribution of cultural contextualization to the understanding of language. More gener- 
ally, it has thrown considerable light on the relationship between language and the 
sociocultural order. 
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5. Harris's seven dimensions of context 
"[I]n the construction of a satisfactory theory of context, the linguist's account of the 
interpretation of utterances must of necessity draw upon [...] the theories and find- 
ings of the social sciences in general", suggests Lyons (1995: 292). In the true spirit 
of this suggestion, Harris (1988) surveyed the multitude of interacting kinds of 
knowledge and awareness that make up the context. According to him, two principal 
dimensions of context are (i) worm knowledge and (ii) knowledge of language. In 
case of (ii), the many facets of linguistic knowledge involving word repetitions, 
abnormal ordering, etc. bring unusual complexities of meaning, as the following 
excerpt from Charles Olson's poem I, Maximus of Gloucester, to You illustrates: 
But that which matters, that which insists, that which wili last 
where shall you find it, my people, how, where shall you listen 
when all is become billboards, when all, even silence, is 
when even the gulls, 
my roofs, 
when even you, when sound itself 
As for (i), Leech (1981: 69) notes that the study of interpretation i  context 
involves encyclopedic knowledge of the world - which, he concedes, cannot be 
practically included in the study of semantics - and gives the following example: 
"[I]t is relevant to the interpretation f the sentence "Shall I put the sweater on?" to know whether any- 
one has yet invented a sweater warmed by an electric urrent." 
Harris enumerates five additional dimensions of context. These are the (iii) autho- 
rial, (iv) generic, (v) collective, (vi) specific, and (vii) textual dimensions. The 
authorial dimension arises from the body of available information about the author 
and is clearly crucial in reconstructing the meaning of a text. Some authors do expect 
a prospective reader to be knowledgeable about particular pieces of information 
about themselves. For instance, the casual reader of Soft Machine (by William Bur- 
roughs) will be doing a better job of interpretation when she knows that the work has 
an autobiographical character and that the narrator in the following opening para- 
graph is Burroughs himself (Burroughs, 1980): 
"I was working the hole with the sailor and we did not do bad. Fifteen cents on an average night boost- 
ing the afternoons and short-timing the dawn we made out from the land of the free. But I was running 
out of veins." (Burrows (1980: 9)) 
By the generic dimension, Harris hints at genre, i.e., the category of literary text 
characterized by a particular style, form, or content (cf. the SPEAKING model of 
Hymes, discussed earlier). It is clear that formulae like 'Once upon a time ... '  are 
framing devices, or 'markers of footing' in Goffman's terms. They are most conve- 
niently regarded as indexes of the genres which the speaker is producing or invok- 
ing. (They can also be seen as kinds of contextualization cues in the sense of 
Gumperz.) 
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The author's intent to write will necessarily involve some notion of genre (poem, 
novel, detective story, etc.) and he will most probably employ the conventions of his 
chosen genre to help the reader assign the proper interpretation (Kessler et al., 1997). 
That is probably why an academic paper usually invokes a well-known framing 
device associated with that genre, namely, extensive references. To take a different 
example, in the following poem (For Hettie, by LeRoi Jones), humor is certainly 
part of the author's intent and is achieved by parodying the use of proper English: 
My wife is left-handed. 
[...] 
[...] I sit 
patiently, trying to tell her 
what's right. TAKE THAT DAMM 
PENCIL OUTI'A THAT HAND. YOU'RE 
RITING BACKWARDS. & such. [...] 
It may be thought hat awareness of genre cannot be easily achieved unless the 
reader is knowledgeable about the definitions and commentary of literary historians, 
e.g., 'a sonnet is a lyric poem written in a single stanza, which ... etc. etc'. This 
seems highly questionable. There has been considerable work in conversation analy- 
sis and anthropological linguistics on 'genre as practice' (see for example Hanks, 
1987). Hanks (1996) demonstrates that the social role of the shaman in curing cere- 
monials in Mayan culture is essentially connected to his skill to recite text fragments 
of a particular genre, possessed by him, and appropriately called curing chants. 
Now, the shaman enacts these texts in the (ritual) context of curing, which, to a con- 
siderable xtent, is built by the very enaction of them. Hanks's result is perhaps a 
natural one in that the dynamic, socially constitutive qualities of context are 
unavoidable: each incremental act within an interaction updates the existing context 
and prepares new ground for subsequent interaction. 
Harris regards the collective dimension as crucial for the following reason. Leav- 
ing the co-textual ambiguities aside (for they are rather well-understood, thanks in 
part to semantic theory), contextual ambiguities are usually born out of a misplaced 
belief on the part of the author that the reader has access to the author's collective 
dimension. The author usually assumes that his imaginary reader has a general grasp 
of the relevant social institutions, customs, norms, etiquette, topical news items, and 
cultural and historical facts. Harris (1988: 107) notes that: 
"Such collective knowledge is the subject of investigation from a variety of disciplines: ocio-linguis- 
tics, ethnomethodology, the sociology of knowledge. John Searle calls such knowledge and awareness 
'factual background information'; Charles Altieri calls it the 'cultural grammar'; [Kent] Bach and 
[Robert] Harnish speak of 'mutual contextual beliefs'; socio-linguists like Dell Hymes speak of the 
'ethnography of communication'. Since we also know that we don't all share the same knowledge, we 
constantly make judgments about how much and what sort of background information orcultural gram- 
mar persons to whom we are speaking or writing are likely to possess." 
The specific dimension - in contrast o the collective dimension, which attributes 
knowledge to the anticipated reader - comprises elements that are specific to the sit- 
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uation in which a discourse occurs. Harris enumerates five interdependent aspects of 
the specific dimension (1988:112) :  
"1. The physical situation: A porch in the second Sacks example given earlier. 
2. The psychological conditions of the discourse participants: The teacher is indifferent and the little 
girl is angry and fearful, in the same example. 
3. The socio-cultural relationship: Teacher/student, in the same example. 
4. Interpersonal wareness: Specific personal knowledge of shared experiences, close to nil in the 
same example. I have already noted earlier that interpersonal wareness receives a fine treatment in
Clark and Carlson (1981). Their proposal is that when a listener tries to understand what a speaker 
means, the process he goes through can be explained in terms of a common ground - the knowl- 
edge, beliefs, and suppositions that the two share in a technical way. 
5. For any sentence, the immediately preceding ones: Obvious." 
Finally, the textual dimension refers to the totality of arguments, events, actions, 
and so on, in the way these are given in the text. A coherent ext is in fact a system 
of interlocking subtexts, whose interpretations against the unfolding whole make 
small contributions to the meaning of the complete text. The process is, borrowing 
T.S. E l iot 's  words, one with 'hundred indecis ions'  and 'hundred visions and revi- 
s ions',  as the fol lowing excerpt explains (Harris, 1988:119) :  
"As the text unrolls, there is not only the cumulative build-up of effect through the linking of remem- 
bered earlier elements to the new one. There is sometimes a backward flow, a revision of earlier under- 
standings, emphases, or attitudes; there may even be the emergence of a completely altered framework 
or principle of organization." 
That the interactional context is continually being developed with each successive 
action is an observation Heritage (1984) also made. According to him, utterances 
and the social actions they embody are treated as doubly contextual. First, utterances 
and actions are context-shaped. This s imply means that their contributions cannot be 
adequately appreciated unless the context in which they operate is taken into 
account. Second, utterances and actions are context-renewing. Every utterance wil l  
form the subsequent context for some fol lowing action in a sequence; it wil l  thus 
contribute to the contextual f ramework which lets one understand the next action. 
Addit ional ly,  each action will function to renew context, where ' renewal '  is under- 
stood as one or more of the processes of maintaining, adjusting, altering, and so on. 
6. Context and disambiguation 
It is heartening to find echoes of  Harr is '  observations in other works. For exam- 
ple, Crystal (1991 : 78-79) also assumes that context encompasses the total l inguis- 
tic and non-l inguistic background of a text. The l inguistic aspects are widely known; 
they include the specific parts of a text surrounding a unit (e.g., a word) which is the 
focus of attention. The non-l inguistic aspects (which Crystal calls the situational 
context) include the immediate situation in which the unit is employed,  and the 
awareness by the author and reader of what has been said earl ier plus the pertinent 
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bel ief  system (i.e., those beliefs and presupposit ions germane to the text at hand). 
Here's  another concise description of  this two-fold character of  context, this time 
coming from Blackburn (1994: 80): 
"In linguistics, context is the parts of an utterance surrounding a unit and which may affect both its 
meaning and its grammatical contribution. [ ..] Context also refers to the wider situation, either of the 
speaker or of the surroundings, that may play a part in determining the significance of a saying. Some- 
times the term co-text is used for the narrow, purely linguistic ontext." 
An author assumes that a reader wil l  try to obtain a coherent interpretation of his 
text. In order to facil itate this, he provides help as to which contextual dimensions 
are relevant. If  there is information the reader is not presumed to have, the author 
makes it avai lable using assorted devices. But in the end, we can never be certain 
about the authorial intention; the best we can do as a reader is to assess probabil it ies. 
Accordingly,  the so-cal led disambiguating role of context should be taken with a 
grain of  salt. Whi le it is true that the most useful role context plays is in the disam- 
biguation of  authorial meaning, this disambiguation will at best attach a certain prob- 
abil ity to each available alternative reading (or sense). (Needless to say, a totally 
ungainly alternative would have zero probabi l i ty assigned to it.) In the words of 
Leech (1981 : 66 and 68, respectively):  
"[The] specification of context (whether linguistic or non-linguistic) has the effect of narrowing down 
the communicative possibilities of the message as it exists in abstraction from context. (my emphasis) 
[M]eaning-in-context should be regarded as a narrowing down, or probabilistic weighting, of the list of 
potential meanings available to the user of the language." (my emphases) 
In fact, Leech il lustrates the matter by just studying in the sentence 'Shal l  I put ... 
on? '  the various senses of the dict ionary entry 'put ... on' ,  namely (i) 'switch ... 
on' ,  (ii) 'put ... on oneself '  (i.e., 'don . . . ' ) ,  and (iii) 'place ... on top of  something 
else'.  If  we now put 'the blanket'  instead of ' . . . '  then there is considerable potential 
for our sentence to have any of the above three senses. I f  ' . . . '  is replaced with 'the 
portable radio'  then the first sense overrules, although there is a considerable poten- 
tial for the third sense to be applicable, and as expected, a very small possibi l i ty for 
the second sense. If 'the lump of wood '  is substituted for ' . . . '  then none of  the first 
and second senses stand more than a minute chance and the third sense clearly over- 
rules. 
My favorite example demonstrating why we cannot take a text and settle on an 
interpretation without making certain assumptions about the contextual dimensions 
is due to Hobbs (1990: 26): 
"When I first read the opening line of Shakespeare's 68th sonnet, 
Thus is his cheek the map of days outworn, 
I had a very powerful image of an old man whose face was deeply wrinkled. These wrinkles were like 
the roads on the map of the life he had led. Later I read the footnotes. 'Map' meant 'symbol'. Days out- 
worn' meant 'ancient or classical times'. The line meant hat his face was the symbol of classical beauty 
- almost he precise opposite of my interpretation. I had interpreted the line against abelief system that 
included knowledge of Rand-McNally road maps and beliefs about he romanticization of old age. The 
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function of footnotes i  to tell the modem reader something ofthe belief system Shakespeare must have 
assumed he shared with his Elizabethan reader." (my emphases) 
Using Leech's approach, quoted above, we can reformulate this by saying that the 
interpretation achieved as a result of paying attention to the footnotes is the highly 
probable (consequently, the most authentic) one. Hobbs' own interpretation, while it 
had initially enough intuitive elements to justify it, is thus defeated and assigned zero 
probability in the end. 
In the remainder of the paper, I take a quick look at the proposals of Hobbs (1990) 
and Barwise (1989), which also include the reader's belief system and the author's 
intention in elucidating the meaning of a literary work. While these two works have 
numerous aspects which overlap with Harris' theory, I will not explicitly highlight 
these coincidences but rather let the reader notice them. 
7. Hobbs and belief systems 
Hobbs assumes that the reader's interpretation procedure works by translating the 
text into some knowledge representation scheme (e.g., logical formulas) and then 
drawing inferences from her belief system so as to satisfy the requirements for a 
'good' interpretation. He enumerates four crucial elements as belonging to the set of 
requirements: 
1. There is a common ground, of the sort Clark and Carlson (1981) advocate, 
between the author and the reader. 
2. There are constraints in effect which ease the interpretation f many instances of 
metaphor and metonymy. ('But metaphors do not automatically catch on and 
influence people; they have to fit in with a feeling in the air, or Zeitgeist, which 
differs from language to language', cautions Aitchison, 1997: 91.) 
3. Different parts of the text should be taken as coherently interconnected, leading 
to a unitary structure for the whole. (This also explains in part the difficulties 
encountered in interpreting post-modem literature.) 
4. The text should be related by the reader to her theory of what the author is try- 
ing to achieve. 
Hobbs comes up with a formula which he thinks is applicable in general: 
(1) F(K,  T) = I 
Here F is an interpretation procedure mployed by the reader. Hobbs believes that 
AI work in discourse analysis gave at least some indication what F looks like. T is 
the sequence of words that comprise the text; it is assumed to be given. (Hobbs puts 
forward an interesting account of how realistic this assumption is and how it may be 
disputed. I omit this discussion because it does not contribute to the problem at 
hand.) I is the interpretation, i.e., a formal representation f the content of the text 
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that satisfies the four points made above. Hobbs is especially careful about the fourth 
point (1990: 18): 
"The text needs to be related to the [reader's] theory of what is going on in the environment. Typically, 
but not always, this includes the [reader's] beliefs about he author's intention, or more generally, the 
author's plan as it unfolds in time; the [reader] should try to relate the text o what he [reader] believes 
the author is trying to accomplish." 
K is the belief system and includes the whole range of beliefs, from naive knowl- 
edge about the physical world (Akman and ten Hagen, 1989) to interpretive conven- 
tions for assorted genres (Kessler et al., 1997). Basically, it is in K the context is 
encoded. 
Since F and T are assumed to be given in equation (1), we must determine K and 
I. We have an equation with two unknowns. Hobbs suggests that the way we 'solve' 
the equation is via hypothesizing a K-I pair. That is, we consider a particular inter- 
pretation I of the text together with a belief set K that will uphold I. (Hobbs calls the 
pair a theory of  the text.) To decide among alternative theories of text, the reader 
tries to find the best K and the best I, in the light of the four desiderata (for I) men- 
tioned earlier. 
8. Barwise and authorial intentions 
Barwise (1989) sees all critical discourse as comprising one or more parts of the 
following triple: author, literary text, and reader (critic). The critic tries to capture 
what the author has created. In this endeavor, she assumes that the author's creative 
process finds its roots in the author's intentions. Barwise notes that the original 
intention and the 'achieved' intention may not coincide. During the creative process, 
what the author is trying to do is intentional. However, once the work is created, then 
we have something actual, so the critic should talk about the effect the work aims to 
evoke, the principles organizing the work into a whole, the meaning the work sug- 
gests, etc. 
Like Hobbs (1990), Barwise provides an abstract equation formulating the rela- 
tion between meaning and content: 
(2) Content R (S, C) = P 
Here, R stands for the conventions of the language, C for the circumstances (con- 
text) shared by the speaker and listener (or the author and the reader), while P is the 
propositional content he speaker wants to convey. The author's task is to find an 
expression S that satisfies this equation. The task of the reader, on the other hand, is 
to determine P, given R, C, and S. All of the four parameters in equation (2) are at 
the speaker's disposal. He can 'adjust' them, as long as the equation is satisfied. 
Clearly, if the author experiments with R - as in Joyce's Finnegans Wake or Bur- 
roughs' Naked Lunch - there is a lessened chance of his being understood, at least 
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by the casual reader. (Unless, that is, the original text is accompanied by illuminat- 
ing marginal notes and comments, pace Martin Gardner's annotated Alice's Adven- 
tures in Wonderland.) 
The circumstances (C) can be studied as four parts which possibly overlap: 
1. Articulated constituents: This is what we have termed as co-text earlier. In gen- 
eral, it determines the interpretation of indexicals, among others. In the Bur- 
roughs example, the co-text contributes the narrator with 'I'. 
2. Unarticulated constituents: These are things whose existence follow. When the 
narrator says 'we did not do bad' in the Burroughs example, we understand that 
"we" stands for the narrator plus the sailor. 
3. Articulated non-constituents: In the Burroughs example, when the narrator says 
that he was 'running out of veins', we infer that he was frequently doing junk, 
but this is not part of the content of what the narrator said. 
4. Unarticulated non-constituents: In the Jones poem, the line 'My wife is left- 
handed' suggests that there is a background convention in force in the narrator's 
world, whereby people writing with their right hands make up the standard set. 
The reader of a literary text (S) is faced with one equation having three 
unknowns: R, C, and P. As in Hobbs' equation (1), the solution may not be unique. 
The task of literary interpretation is to use the available information regarding the 
unknowns (e.g., biographical material about the author, information about the cul- 
tural setting in which the text was written, etc.) in order to limit the range of their 
possible values. 
9. Conclusion 
Not long ago, I was visiting Boston for a small workshop on (what else?) context. 
After a demanding morning session, I walked into the MIT Bookstore for a bit of 
shopping. Walking along the isles I noticed on a crowded shelf a little sign which 
read: 
NOAM CHOMSKY'S SECTION IS A LITTLE TO THE LEFT 
I found this fairly clever! In fact, my expectation that the workshop audience 
would also find the tongue-in-cheek message of this sign entertaining was fulfilled. 
When I referred to it at some point during my talk I got quite a few chuckles. But 
what kind of understanding did the author of the sign expect me (the reader) to have 
as a result of my seeing it? In treating this question in any detail, it was unavoidable 
for me to touch upon the notions of authorial intentions vis-a-vis sociocultural con- 
text. 
On the other hand, I remembered that one of the common assumptions of early AI 
research ad been that in order to build a commonsense r asoning system (say, a 
robot), some form of decontextualized meaning is necessary. In other words, all 
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kinds of ambiguities must be dismantled from our terms and rules. Nowadays, we all 
know that this is not a realistic strategy. As Winograd notes (1990: 180): 
"Such approaches work for the cases that programmers anticipate, but of course are subject o the infi- 
nite regress of trying to decontextualize context. The new terms or rules themselves depend on interpre- 
tation that is not represented in the system." (my emphasis) 
In this paper, I have used several examples from literary theory to show that inter- 
pretation is possible only within shared contexts. Since such contexts necessarily 
have a social disposition, this paper can be seen as underlining the efficacy of a 
social sciences tance that is geared towards a better understanding of the 'magic' of 
context. I realize that this is difficult and, furthermore, not what the AI archetype 
would consider terribly interesting, but the bad news is that it is probably the only 
approach. 
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